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Revealing the underlying preferences of a forecaster has always been at the core of 
much controversy. Herein, we build on the multivariate loss function concept and 
propose a flexible and multivariate family of likelihoods. This allows examining 
whether a vector of forecast errors, along with control variables, shapes forecaster’s 
preferences and, therefore, the underlying multivariate, non-separable, loss function. 
We estimate the likelihood function using Bayesian exponentially tilted empirical 
likelihood (BETEL), which reveals the shape of the parameter and the power of the 
multivariate loss function. In the empirical section, the reported evidence reveals that 
the EU Commission forecasts are predominantly asymmetric, leaning towards 
optimism in the year ahead, whilst a correction towards pessimism occurs in the 
current year forecast. There is some variability of this asymmetry across Member 
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Given the importance of forecasting in economics, in finance and operational research, 
it is hardly surprising that testing for the underlying statistical properties of forecasts 
has a long tradition that can be traced back to Theil (1966). Mincer and Zarnowitz, 
(1969) offered a way of streamlining this procedure by testing whether forecast errors 
have zero mean and are uncorrelated with information available at the time that 
forecasts are formed. Such testing implicitly assumes that the forecaster has an 
underlying loss function that is symmetric and quadratic.1 The symmetry of the 
underlying loss function of the forecaster is a very strong assumption as in the presence 
of asymmetry in the loss function previous tests are losing validity. If indeed the 
underlying loss function of the forecaster is asymmetric then the standard Theil-
Mincer-Zarnowitz tests for efficiency are biased and thereby misleading (see also 
Clements, 2015). Elliott et al. (2005 and 2008) propose tests that allow the estimation 
of the shape parameter of an underlying loss function, and thereby reveal whether the 
latter is symmetric, or not. 2 Knowing the shape of the loss function is important, as it 
reveals the forecaster’s underlying preferences and thus its behaviour.3  
 
The results presented in this paper complement previous studies and fill the gap in the 
literature by providing estimations of the underlying multivariate loss function 
parameter, including whether it is linear or non-linear, as well allowing for examining 
the impact of control variables on the shape of the loss function. Moreover, we propose 
a flexible likelihood function, which is consistent with the multivariate loss function 
of Komunjer and Owyang (2012). This likelihood function is estimated using 
Bayesian techniques of the multivariate loss as a Bayesian exponentially tilted 
 
1 The role of underlying behaviour of the forecaster or the judgment of the forecaster has been gained 
prominent attention in recent years (see Leitner and Leopold-Wildburger, 2011; Athanasopoulos, et al. 
2017).  Its significance for operational research has also been recognised (Hämäläinen, Luoma, & 
Saarinen, 2013; Petropoulos et al., 2016 and 2014; Sagaert, et al. 2018; Athanasopoulos, et al. 2017), 
where the main objective has been to identify behavioural aspects in forecasting performance.  
2Based on such testing, previous studies emerged, which test the underlying shape of the loss function 
for a variety of forecasts (see Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis, 2008 and 2009).  
3 The hypothesis of rational forecasts has been prominent in economic theory and modelling since 
Lucas’ report (1972). Rational expectations crucially depend on the shape of the loss function, which 
is assumed to be symmetric and mostly non-linear and specifically quadratic (Elliott et al. 2005 and 
2008; Komunjer and Owyang, 2012).  In the event that the underlying loss function is asymmetric, the 
forecaster will show preferences for example to positive forecast errors compared to negative forecast 
errors. Elliott et al. (2005) argue that if such preferences are not widely known then forecasts are not 
rational.  
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empirical likelihood (BETEL).4 In addition, our proposed modelling allows for 
inferences of whether the shape of the multivariate loss function is linear or non-linear. 
In some detail, our contribution to the literature is fourfold: first, we opt for a Bayesian 
estimation of a flexible likelihood multivariate loss function. Second, the proposed 
likelihood function accommodates the estimation of the power of the underlying loss 
function. Our modelling also allows for control variables that would explain the shape 
of the multivariate loss function in single stage estimation.  Third, we provide Monte 
Carlo evidence that the proposed BETEL likelihood function estimation is unbiased 
and consistent. Finally, we provide empirical evidence for the underlying properties 
of the EU Commission forecasts that have been the centre of much attention since the 
financial meltdown in 2009 and the bail out of several euro-area Member States 
thereafter. Our sample covers the period from the 1969–2014 and refers to estimations 
of current year and year-ahead forecasts. We examine the EU Commission forecasts 
using the proposed BETEL multivariate loss function estimation, which does not rely 
on implicitly assuming additive separability across forecast errors. The results show 
that EU forecasts are predominantly asymmetric, and to an extent, in which this 
information is not disclosed, they are not rational, and in addition linearity is also not 
present. The EU forecasts lean towards optimism in years ahead, whereas they correct 
somewhat this optimism towards pessimism in the current-year forecasts. We also 
reveal that for large Member States forecasts lean towards optimism, which has certain 
policy implications. Our multivariate loss function analysis reveals that EU 
Commission forecasts should be interpreted with caution, as they tend to be rather 
optimistic, in particular with respect to GDP growth. Since the GDP growth forecasts 
are key for the assessment of the national economic policy of the EU Member States, 
and in particular in the Euro Area, optimistic forecasts allow for certain leeway against 
tougher fiscal consolidation in order to meet the targets set by the EU treaty. In 
addition, Commission’s forecasts also act as a benchmark upon which the 
conditionality imposed to financial constraint EU Member States is assessed. Such 
forecasts form the base of measuring any ‘fiscal and financial gap’ of the stressed 
 
4 Bekiros and Paccagnini (2014) develop an interesting modeling of Bayesian forecasting based on 
factor-augmented vector autoregressive DSGE models, whilst Groen and Kaptenaions (2016) propose 




Member States that could, in turn, lay the base for requesting corrective actions, such 
as fiscal adjustment and appropriate structural reforms. Therefore, from an economic 
policy point of view, it is imperative that the EU Commission forecasts do not suffer 
from deviations from asymmetry, leaning towards, for example, optimism. 
 
The rest of the paper follows with Section 2, which presents a new family of flexible 
likelihood multivariate loss function of forecasts. Section 3 provides data sources and 
discusses the EU Commission forecasts, whilst Section 4 provides the empirical 
results. Finally, the last section offers some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Methodology: asymmetry in the loss function of forecast errors  
 
The starting point of testing for asymmetry in the loss function is the equation provided 
by Elliott et al. (2005). The authors propose the following loss function: 
 
L e;a, p( ) = a + 1- 2a( ) I e £ 0( )éë ùû×exp - e
p
( ) , (1) 
where e is the forecast error, α (alpha) is the asymmetry parameter, and p is the 
parameter that nests the case of both linear and non-linear underlying loss function.  
 
A drawback of the above loss function is that it is univariate. A univariate loss function 
implicitly assumes additive separability across forecast errors. This assumption could 
result in a bias in the estimation of the asymmetry (Komunjer and Owyang 2012). 
Komunjer and Owyang (2012) proposed a new family of multivariate loss functions 
to test the rationality of a vector of forecast errors without assuming additive 
separability across such errors. They also derive a GMM test for multivariate forecast 
rationality that allows the forecaster's loss to be non-separable across variables and 
considers forecast estimation uncertainty.  
 
2.1 A Bayesian multivariate loss function  
 
We build on Komunjer and Owyang (2012) and propose a Bayesian multivariate 
likelihood loss function. Suppose the forecast error is e Î » n . Define the lp-norm of 
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any vector u Î » n as  
u
p

















.    
 
Moreover, as in Komunjer and Owyang (2012), we consider the potential non-
separability of a multivariate loss function by rewriting the loss function of equation 
(1) following Koenker and Bassett (1978) quantile estimation as: 
 
𝐿𝑝(𝜏, 𝑒) = 2[1 − 𝛼 + 𝜏𝟏 (𝑒)]|𝑒|
𝑝,            (2) 
where 𝜏 = 2𝛼 − 1, and 0 < 𝛼 < 1 is the shape parameter of the univariate loss 
function, 𝑝 ≥ 1, p=1 if the loss function is linear and p=2 if is quadratic, whilst 1 is an 
indicator function 𝟏: ℝ ⟶ [0,1].5 When  the loss function is symmetric. Both 
the direction and the magnitude of the n-vector  , influence the degree of asymmetry 
in the forecaster’s loss. 
 
For simplicity of the presentation we follow the formulation of the multivariate loss 
of Komunjer and Owyang (2012), given as follows: 
 





= + e e e e
   (3) 
 
where  with 
p
1 .  
 





5 In the univariate case, given an exponent p, 1≤ p < ∞, Elliott et al (2005) asymmetry parameter τ, −1 
≤ τ ≤1 could be mapped as a non-negative function of a scalar error 𝑒𝑡∈ℝ
4. There are many losses based 
on this mapping that are flexible to represent the absolute value or quadratic losses along with 
asymmetries. Komunjer and Owyang (2012) extend the univariate family of losses to a vector-valued 
argument 𝑒𝑡 ∈ ℝ





for a certain lower diagonal matrix H , such that , can be interpreted as the 
scale matrix of the forecast error.  
 




where the integrating constant is denoted by , that is 
.  
 








where I t  denotes the information set.  
 
To test for asymmetry in forecast errors Komunjer and Owyang (2012) proceed using 
GMM estimation with a vector of instruments
t
x . This defines: 
 
   (8) 
With the orthogonality conditions as: 
 (9)
 





where .  
 
In our context, since we have defined the multivariate density of forecast errors, we 
propose the following likelihood function: 
 
  (11) 
where X = xt;t =1,...,T{ } is a vector of instruments tx and  is our 
parameter vector. 
 
Note that our focus is on τ, where 𝜏 = 2𝛼 − 1, and 0 < 𝛼 < 1, which is the shape 
parameter of the loss function. Also, it is worth noticing that we treat p  as an unknown 
parameter, although Komunjer and Owyang (2012) consider it as known. In this paper, 
p  is estimated. Thus, if 
p >1 the above loss function is entirely new. For p =1 it can 
be used to define geometric quantiles as in Chaudhuri (1996).  
 
Given a prior ( )   the posterior distribution is proportional to the following 
expression, by Bayes’ theorem: 
 
   (12) 








 is computed 




To analyse the posterior, we use Monte Carlo sampling, which produces draws
 that converge in posterior distribution. Specifically, we use Markov 
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC, Hastings, 1970, Tierney, 1994, Geweke, 1999), which 
consists of two major steps:6 
 
(i) The different elements of  1 n(n 1)/ 2h ,..., h +=H  and parameter p  are 
sampled using a hit-and-run algorithm (Andersen and Diaconis, 2007, 
Belisle, Romeijn and Smith, 1993, see also Roberts and Gilks, 1994). 
(ii) The elements of   are sampled from their posterior conditional 
distribution which is given by:  
 
  (14) 





å . The form of the posterior conditional distribution 
suggests that it is feasible to employ the hit-and-run algorithm for simplicity.  
 
To describe the algorithm, suppose f (x)  is a density in 
m
and let 
Dp = x Î
m : x
p
£1{ }. Given an existing draw x(s) Î Dp , the next draw is 
x(s+1) = x(s) +ld  where d  has a uniform distribution over Dp  and   is generated from 
the distribution whose density is:  
 
 fl l( ) =
f (x + ld)
f (x + rd)drò
.  (15) 
Then the sequence of x(s){ } will converge in total variation norm to the posterior 
(Belisle, Romeijn and Smith, 1993). 
 
6 For more details on the Markov chain Monte Carlo method employed herein please see Appendix A. 
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2.2 The Posterior analysis using Bayesian Exponentially Tilted Empirical 
Likelihood 
The GMM technique proposed by Komunjer and Owyang (2012) lends itself to an 
empirical likelihood generalization of their multivariate loss function. The Bayesian 
generalization of empirical likelihood is known as Bayesian exponentially tilted 
empirical likelihood (BETEL): 
 
( ) 0 =   tE g X  (16) 
The sample moment conditions are:  
 
( ) ( )1 0 − =  =    t
t
TG X g X  (17) 
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The ETEL approach uses exponential tilting (ET) for the implied probabilities and 
empirical likelihood (EL) for the criterion function. If we introduce Lagrange 
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ˆ( ) ( ) ( ). 
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pX  (23) 
To obtain draws that converge in distribution to the posterior we use a MCMC 
technique, which is described in some detail in Appendix A. This is a Hamiltonian 
Monte Carlo method that uses local information about the gradient and the Hessian of 
the log posterior and converges rather fast. 
 
3. Data set: the EU Commission forecasts  
In our empirical application, we focus on macro financial time series forecasting of 
the EU Commission since such forecasts have gained prominent significance in recent 
years. This is so, as several euro-area Member States have received financial 
assistance from the EU, but also the IMF, which has involved strong conditionality, 
mostly fiscal, and economic assessment in real time. Such Member States are Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal, whilst other Member States (see Italy and Spain) have been 
under close scrutiny given their underlying financial and sovereign economic 
weaknesses. Given the scale of the provided financial assistance across the EU, the 
Commission’s forecasts act as a benchmark upon which the conditionality imposed to 
EU Member States is assessed. Crucially, forecasts facilitate the assessment analysis 
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regarding the ‘fiscal and financial gap’ of the stressed Member States that could, in 
turn, lay the base for requesting corrective actions, such as fiscal adjustment and 
appropriate structural reforms.7  
 
Herein, we focus on the annual EU Commission forecasts as reported semi-annually 
in spring and autumn, focusing on current year and year-ahead forecasts.8 In line with 
Keerman (1999) and Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis (2008) and (2009), the current-
year forecast is the first estimation in time, as published in the EU spring forecasts of 
the same year, whilst the forecast of the year ahead comes from the EU autumn 
forecasts and represents the following year.9 Along these lines, the realisation or actual 
forecast variable of the current year is reported in the spring the year ahead, whereas 
the realisation of the year-ahead forecast is reported in the autumn the year ahead. For 
reasons of data availability over time, we shall consider the EU-12, excluding Member 
States that joined the EU later than 1995.10 To this end, our time series sample spans 
from 1969 to 2014, the longer possible period for EU forecasts.  
 
Diagram 1 presents the forecast errors, defined as forecast minus realisation, for the 
main variables of our empirical testing. However, for prolonged periods there is 
fluctuation of forecast errors around zero, since financial crisis forecast errors appear 
to pick. For example, growth forecast errors are positive and large in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis, indicating over-prediction and thus optimism, in particular for the 
year ahead forecast.  This over-prediction in the growth rate was somewhat corrected 
in 2011 during the euro-area sovereign debt crisis, but it has reoccurred since. The 
growth is the corner stone of the DG ECFIN of the EU Commission forecasts exercise 
 
7 Previous research (see Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis 2008 and 2009) shows that the EU 
Commission forecasts have been optimistic. In particular regarding growth for some large Member 
States. It would be of interest, therefore, to examine whether our empirical test based on a multivariate 
loss function would provide further evidence of asymmetry or whether asymmetry is subdued within a 
multivariate framework as demonstrated by Komunjer and Owyang (2012).  
8 One of the advantages of using EU Commission forecasts is that they are widely considered as 
independent compared to the corresponding national forecasts. EU forecasts act as the benchmark in 
the assessment of the EU’s national economies. National forecasts might not be independent and, 
therefore, could lean towards optimism. For example, additional ex-ante fiscal consolidation measures 
would be warranted in the case of under forecasting GDP growth so as to meet the government balance 
target of 3% of GDP, ceteris paribus revenue and expenditure elasticities, as well as fiscal multipliers. 
Similarly, under forecasting GDP growth for EU Member States in financial assistance programs, such 
as Greece where enhanced conditionality is imposed, would imply additional fiscal consolidation. 
9 The DG ECFIN is responsible for providing the EU Commission forecasts in spring and autumn 
each year. 
10 Forecasts at EU level would refer to EU-12 thereafter.  
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as it plays a crucial role in the ex-ante assessment of the EU’s Member States. Positive 
forecast errors in the growth would suggest that the DG ECFIN allows some leeway 
to Member States towards optimism. 
Diagram 1. EU-12 Current- and Year-Ahead Forecast Errors. 
 








































































































































































































































































































































































Moreover, some descriptive evidence of optimism in the growth forecast by the DG 
ECOFIN is reported in Diagram 1. The outcome of the euro-area GDP growth 
recorded a decline by 0.4% in 2012 (see Diagram 1), whereas it was forecasted a year 
earlier by DG ECFIN to increase by 1.8%. This is, indeed, a large forecast error. 
Descriptive statistics show positive forecast errors, defined as forecast minus 
realisation, and thus over-prediction and optimism, in particular in the years following 
the financial meltdown in 2009. Optimism in growth forecasting would imply 
optimism in other variable too, most importantly the government balance. The 
government balance is the key variable in terms of the annual assessment of the EU’s 
Member States. Member States must follow the fiscal rule of having deficit less than 
3% of GDP as stated in the EU treaty, so much so for Member States that have received 
financial assistance in recent years and are subjected to strong conditionality.  
 
Regarding the inflation, a prudent economic agent may exhibit higher aversion to 
positive forecast errors versus negative ones of the same size. This would imply that 
the agent could assign higher loss for over-prediction (versus under-prediction). 
Similarly, for a government balance a prudent economic agent may exhibit higher 
aversion to negative forecast errors versus positive ones of the same size, reflecting 
higher loss for under-prediction.11  Diagram 1 shows that forecast errors of 
government balances take negative values since 2010, implying persistence towards 
under prediction since the financial crisis, especially in the case of year ahead 
forecasts. The financial crisis has led to the euro area sovereign debt crisis 
characterised by large fiscal imbalances. The EU Commission fiscal forecasts appear 
to be rather optimistic during recent recession EU episodes. Along these lines forecast 
errors for investment also exhibit negative values in recent years.  
 
Another interesting finding from Diagram 1 is that there is some variability between 
current-year and year-ahead forecast errors. For example, for the growth rate, 
investment and the current account balance, since 2010 the forecast error appears to 
be higher for the year-ahead forecast than that of the current-year forecast. This might 
 
11 Note that government deficit carries a negative sign. Negative forecast errors would mean that 
fiscal balances turn out to be worse than forecasted. 
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imply that EU Commission preferences could vary between year-ahead and current-
year forecasts. 
 
Given this preliminary descriptive evidence, it would be of interest to test for 
asymmetries in the underlying loss function of the EU Commission forecasts, whether 
univariate or multivariate. The variables of our analysis are GDP, government balance, 
current account, inflation, investment and unemployment.12  
 
4. Empirical Results  
In this section, we report estimations of alphas (α), the asymmetry parameter from the 
likelihood function of equation (11), which will reveal the underlying shape of the EU 
Commission forecasts, both for univariate as well multivariate loss function case. In 
the estimation of alphas, we employ the Bayesian exponentially tilted empirical 
likelihood (BETEL). As a first empirical exercise, we perform the univariate loss 
function and then compare the results with the multivariate case in a second stage. In 
a third stage, control variables are employed to assert their impact on alphas. Finally, 
we provide Monte Carlo evidence of the efficiency of our estimation method and 
compare it with the efficiency of  Komunjer and Owyang (2012) method.  
 
4.1. The shape of the loss function: the univariate case  
Note that using our univariate loss function in Equation (2), we initially get estimates 
of ‘τ’ as well as its median and standard errors. Having derived ‘τ’ we proceed with 
estimation of alphas ‘α’ from 𝜏 = 2𝛼 − 1. Simply, if 0 < 𝛼 < 1 and different than 
0.5, it implies asymmetry in the shape of the underlying loss function. Also, note that 
we impose no restrictions on whether the flexible loss functions is linear or non-
linear.13 
 
In Table 1 we report alphas, ‘α’, for the GDP growth for both the case of year ahead 
and the current year forecasts. Perhaps not surprisingly, the results show that the 
underlying loss function of the EU Commission for GDP growth is asymmetric for all 
Member States, but a few (see Germany for the current-year forecast, Netherlands and 
 
12 We select forecasts and the corresponding realisations in line with Artis (1996), Keereman (1999) 
and (2003), and Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis (2008) and (2009).  
13 The power of the loss function is given as p≥0. 
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France for the year-ahead forecast). It is also striking that alphas take values less than 
0.5 in most of the Member States for the year-ahead forecast GDP growth. Moreover, 
if alpha, ‘α’ takes a value less than 0.5 then the EU Commission will have directional 
preferences in favour of over-prediction of GDP growth and thus optimism, otherwise 
it has preferences in favour of under-prediction in GDP growth and thus pessimism. 
The results show that the EU Commission is pessimistic for Germany and Greece for 
the year-ahead forecast. The Greek case is of interest as pessimism prevails also in the 
current year. Such pessimism in the growth forecast would imply that the EU 
Commission in its assessment of the state of the Greek economy would request for 
enhanced fiscal consolidation efforts. On the other hand, the EU Commission 
preferences lean towards optimism for Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, 
Luxemburg, Portugal, UK and EU-12 for the year ahead. For the current-year forecast, 
the EU Commission shifts its preferences against over-prediction towards pessimism 
for Germany, Spain, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, UK and EU. These 
results show that that the EU Commission takes a rather more conservative stand and 
exhibit pessimistic preferences for current year compared to year-ahead GDP growth 
forecasts. This evidence shows that the EU Commission has two faces when it comes 
to forecasts, which depend on the forecasting horizon. In general, it casts an optimistic 
preference for the year ahead and corrects this towards pessimism for the current year. 
Similar to Janus, whose two faces allows him to look at opposite directions at the same 
time, the EU Commission forecasts exhibit two opposite preferences at the same time. 
The EU forecasts offer an optimistic glimpse of the year ahead but correct to 
pessimism for the current year.  
 















TABLE 1: GDP forecast errors for the univariate loss function. 
 Current year Year ahead 
 
^
  Med. SE 
^
  Med. SE 
BE 0.4515 0.4435 0.0963 0.4249 0.4233 0.08387 
DK 0.5629 0.5626 0.08301 0.4364 0.4344 0.07877 
DE 0.5224 0.5222 0.0813 0.5911 0.5935 0.07493 
EL 0.6512 0.6512 0.007361 0.6502 0.6503 0.006259 
ES 0.6995 0.6997 0.005971 0.3128 0.3129 0.006787 
FR 0.5859 0.5867 0.1006 0.5388 0.5382 0.08597 
IE 0.5306 0.537 0.09577 0.3777 0.3787 0.1176 
IT 0.6156 0.6133 0.08761 0.494 0.4926 0.08854 
LU 0.6238 0.6251 0.08184 0.4401 0.443 0.09328 
NL 0.4609 0.4592 0.08413 0.5025 0.5042 0.08474 
PT 0.3074 0.3074 0.006232 0.3088 0.3089 0.006119 
UK 0.7549 0.7562 0.07497 0.4502 0.4501 0.08059 
EU 0.6056 0.6019 0.0905 0.465 0.4648 0.07637 
Note: Estimations of the shape parameter, ‘alpha’ 
^
 , of a univariate loss function. In the table we 
report posterior means, posterior medians and posterior standard deviations. BE is Belgium, DK 
Denmark, DE Germany, EL Greece, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT Italy, LU Luxemburg, NL 
Netherlands, PT Portugal, UK United Kingdom, EU European Union. The instrument set includes:  
Constant and one lag of all variables in the multivariate, non-separable loss, function. 
 
Previous evidence, see Christodoulakis and Mamatzakis (2008) and (2009), provide 
estimates of alphas and therefore the shape parameter of a univariate loss function, 
opting for the Elliott et al. (2005) GMM estimation, imposing either a linear or a 
quadratic loss function. The authors report asymmetry for large Member States 
towards optimism compared to small Member States of the EU. Our findings 
complement previous evidence and show that asymmetry in the EU Commission 
forecasts is dominant for all EU Member States, but two, and there is a shift in the 
direction of preferences from the year ahead to the current year forecasts.14  
  
 
14 Our method allows to estimate posterior density of ps, and thus testing whether the underlying loss 
function is linear or quadratic, rather than imposing such functional form as in Elliott et al. (2005) and 
Komunjer and Owyang (2012).  In order to facilitate the presentation of our findings we opt not to 
report ps. In the majority of testing, the loss function deviates from being quadratic. Results are 
available on request.  Appendix B reports Diagrams B1 to B6 with densities of alphas and ps for the 
EU forecasts. These diagrams show that for most forecasts, whether current year or year ahead, the loss 
function is neither symmetric nor linear.   
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Table 2 reports the univariate loss function shape parameter, alphas, for the 
government balance. With the exception of Italy and Portugal, the loss function of the 
EU leans towards under-prediction, and thus optimism, for the year-ahead forecast. 
Notice that under-predicting government balance implies that Member States of the 
EU would have certain leeway when it comes to the required fiscal adjustment. This 
strong under-prediction for the year-ahead forecast shifts to over-prediction in the 
current-year forecast, for example in Belgium, Germany, Greece and Ireland. A 
familiar pattern, once more, is observed as the directional preferences of the EU 
Commission lean towards optimism for the year-ahead forecast, whereas such 
preferences are corrected towards pessimism in the current-year forecast. 
 
 
TABLE 2: Government balance forecast errors for the univariate loss function. 
 Current year Year ahead 
 
^
  Med. SE 
^
  Med. SE 
BE 0.8961 0.9351 0.1028 0.3897 0.3905 0.07985 
DK 0.4913 0.4889 0.09429 0.4697 0.4703 0.09994 
DE 0.8942 0.9087 0.07137 0.4308 0.4365 0.1394 
EL 0.6948 0.6949 0.005375 0.3615 0.3615 0.006503 
ES 0.3321 0.332 0.006244 0.3193 0.3194 0.006619 
FR 0.3914 0.3926 0.08525 0.4257 0.4219 0.07785 
IE 0.6011 0.6019 0.06204 0.4462 0.4439 0.07433 
IT 0.4547 0.4543 0.0569 0.56 0.5663 0.06317 
LU 0.4143 0.4183 0.09309 0.3737 0.3664 0.1371 
NL 0.3026 0.2996 0.09729 0.3661 0.3686 0.08971 
PT 0.7309 0.731 0.005018 0.6914 0.6915 0.00633 
UK 0.3929 0.39 0.07897 0.4992 0.4964 0.0975 
EU 0.3253 0.3221 0.07543 0.4451 0.4475 0.08983 
Note: Estimations of the shape parameter, ‘alpha’ 
^
 , of a univariate loss function. In the table we 
report posterior means, posterior medians and posterior standard deviations. BE is Belgium, DK 
Denmark, DE Germany, EL Greece, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT Italy, LU Luxemburg, NL 
Netherlands, PT Portugal, UK United Kingdom, EU European Union.  The instrument set includes:  
Constant and one lag of all variables in the multivariate, non-separable loss, function. 
 
 
Table 3 reports alphas for inflation. Strikingly, for all but one case (that is for 
Netherlands), the loss function exhibits preferences towards over-prediction for the 
year-ahead forecast. These preferences shift, once more, towards under-prediction for 
the current year forecast. Notably, for some EU Member States, such as Greece, 
Germany and Italy, the over-prediction in inflation for the year-ahead forecast 
becomes under-prediction in the current year. Inflation forecasts are of economic 
significance as they affect all nominal macroeconomic variables, notably government 
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debt; for example, higher inflation would assert a positive impact on debt. Since 
Greece and Italy hold high government debts, over-prediction in inflation in the year 
ahead would imply lower measurement of nominal government debts as percentage of 
GDP, which could ease pressure on fiscal consolidation efforts. However, current-year 
preferences towards under-prediction of inflation forecasts would have the opposite 
impact.   
       
 
TABLE 3: Inflation forecast errors for the univariate loss function. 
 Current year Year ahead 
 
^
  Med. SE 
^
  Med. SE 
BE 0.4951 0.4954 0.0873 0.5643 0.5627 0.0887 
DK 0.5519 0.5686 0.1235 0.5698 0.5734 0.07239 
DE 0.4429 0.4377 0.08266 0.6002 0.603 0.1052 
EL 0.3574 0.3574 0.006413 0.6438 0.6438 0.006368 
ES 0.7062 0.7061 0.006159 0.7342 0.7343 0.00516 
FR 0.4726 0.4719 0.08324 0.592 0.5924 0.08206 
IE 0.5046 0.506 0.08991 0.651 0.6536 0.08098 
IT 0.4019 0.4046 0.08341 0.6825 0.6835 0.07027 
LU 0.5553 0.5572 0.08849 0.8163 0.8163 0.005063 
NL 0.5194 0.5212 0.08523 0.4449 0.4466 0.08681 
PT 0.7177 0.7177 0.005222 0.7075 0.7076 0.00587 
UK 0.4992 0.4988 0.07739 0.5851 0.5809 0.08709 
EU 0.4948 0.503 0.1023 0.5428 0.5409 0.07744 
Note: Estimations of the shape parameter, ‘alpha’ a
^
, of a univariate loss function. In the 
table we report posterior means, posterior medians and posterior standard deviations. BE is 
Belgium, DK Denmark, DE Germany, EL Greece, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT Italy, 
LU Luxemburg, NL Netherlands, PT Portugal, UK United Kingdom, EU European Union.  
The instrument set includes:  Constant and one lag of all variables in the multivariate, non-
separable loss, function. 
 
Table, 4, 5 and 6 report results (‘alphas’) for unemployment, investment and current 
account, respectively. Unemployment is of interest as the revealed preferences lean 
towards pessimism in the year ahead, whilst this pessimism is subdued in most cases 
in the current year. For example, in the case of unemployment the EU Commission 
assigns higher loss when the forecast for unemployment in the year ahead is lower 
than the actual unemployment. This preference is reversed in the current-year 
unemployment forecast. Forecasts regarding investment in the year ahead show a 
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TABLE 4: Unemployment forecast errors for the univariate loss function. 
 Current year Year ahead 
 
^
  Med. SE 
^
  Med. SE 
BE 0.4687 0.4621 0.1222 0.2776 0.2765 0.07661 
DK 0.5826 0.5922 0.08451 0.4501 0.451 0.07938 
DE 0.3639 0.3638 0.09121 0.3968 0.3996 0.08237 
EL 0.6344 0.6344 0.006729 0.3778 0.3778 0.007258 
ES 0.6797 0.6798 0.007146 0.3242 0.3241 0.006171 
FR 0.5644 0.5661 0.1029 0.3123 0.3123 0.07187 
IE 0.5132 0.5073 0.1002 0.369 0.3671 0.06544 
IT 0.5282 0.5292 0.07564 0.3918 0.3939 0.07847 
LU 0.5761 0.5855 0.0974 0.3594 0.3495 0.09029 
NL 0.4866 0.4864 0.07089 0.4083 0.4074 0.07782 
PT 0.2972 0.2971 0.005568 0.3016 0.3015 0.005938 
UK 0.8142 0.8196 0.07425 0.3524 0.3545 0.07073 
EU 0.6479 0.6526 0.08211 0.3606 0.3659 0.08307 
Note: Estimations of the shape parameter, ‘alpha’ 
^
 , of a univariate loss function. In the 
table we report posterior means, posterior medians and posterior standard deviations. BE is 
Belgium, DK Denmark, DE Germany, EL Greece, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT Italy, 
LU Luxemburg, NL Netherlands, PT Portugal, UK United Kingdom, EU European Union.  
The instrument set includes:  Constant and one lag of all variables in the multivariate, non-















TABLE 5: Investment forecasts errors for the univariate loss function. 




  Med. SE 
^
  Med. SE 
BE 0.7031 0.7063 0.1120 0.6098 0.6098 0.08577 
DK 0.6757 0.6749 0.08033 0.6737 0.6769 0.07189 
DE 0.4376 0.4336 0.07502 0.5163 0.5158 0.07245 
EL 0.6141 0.6142 0.009726 0.3559 0.3559 0.006354 
ES 0.7164 0.7165 0.005414 0.3253 0.3254 0.006384 
FR 0.5181 0.518 0.07874 0.4936 0.4931 0.07454 
IE 0.3449 0.3409 0.0319 0.3668 0.3705 0.09573 
IT 0.6278 0.6218 0.0213 0.5638 0.5632 0.07017 
LU 0.487 0.4885 0.0701 0.5873 0.5869 0.06369 
NL 0.5264 0.5234 0.08467 0.4986 0.4993 0.06524 
PT 0.3365 0.3365 0.006715 0.3163 0.3163 0.006127 
UK 0.58 0.5789 0.07894 0.536 0.533 0.07355 
EU 0.4979 0.4941 0.07688 0.472 0.4688 0.06823 
Note: Estimations of the shape parameter, ‘alpha’ 
^
 , of a univariate loss function. In the table 
we report posterior means, posterior medians and posterior standard deviations. BE is 
Belgium, DK Denmark, DE Germany, EL Greece, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT Italy, 
LU Luxemburg, NL Netherlands, PT Portugal, UK United Kingdom, EU European Union.  
The instrument set includes:  Constant and one lag of all variables in the multivariate, non-
separable loss, function. 
 
 
TABLE 6: Current Account forecast errors for the univariate loss function. 
 Current year Year ahead 
 
^
  Med. SE 
^
  Med. SE 
BE 0.4621 0.4622 0.1053 0.613 0.633 0.2066 
DK 0.537 0.5381 0.11 0.4464 0.4467 0.08437 
DE 0.5634 0.5686 0.08848 0.3795 0.38 0.08415 
EL 0.3211 0.3211 0.006034 0.344 0.3439 0.006119 
ES 0.6778 0.6778 0.006572 0.3266 0.3267 0.006132 
FR 0.5278 0.523 0.1066 0.7097 0.7201 0.1252 
IE 0.5937 0.5985 0.07943 0.462 0.4602 0.09556 
IT 0.6513 0.6532 0.0956 0.4932 0.4942 0.08275 
LU 0.5318 0.5413 0.08546 0.455 0.4555 0.07426 
NL 0.4186 0.4172 0.08615 0.3429 0.3434 0.09538 
PT 0.2959 0.2958 0.005907 0.3096 0.3096 0.005841 
UK 0.5694 0.5782 0.1247 0.4573 0.4582 0.0921 
EU 0.7061 0.7114 0.1324 0.3609 0.3599 0.0936 
Note: Estimations of the shape parameter, ‘alpha’ 
^
 , of a univariate loss function. In the table we 
report posterior means, posterior medians and posterior standard deviations. BE is Belgium, DK 
Denmark, DE Germany, EL Greece, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT Italy, LU Luxemburg, NL 
Netherlands, PT Portugal, UK United Kingdom, EU European Union.  The instrument set includes:  
Constant and one lag of all variables in the multivariate, non-separable loss, function. 
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Overall, we observe clearly for most variables that the EU Commission preferences 
are optimistic in the year ahead and turn pessimistic in the current-year forecast. An 
exception to this behaviour refers to unemployment and CA, but even for such 
variables’ asymmetry is observed. We turn, next, to the multivariate loss function.  
 
4.2. Multivariate loss function for a vector of forecast errors across variables  
In this section, we employ the multivariate likelihood loss function in equation (11) 
and the Bayesian exponentially tilted empirical likelihood (BETEL) as derived from 
Equation (16) to estimate alphas, which are the shape parameters of the multivariate 
loss function. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that examines 
multivariate loss function for the EU Commission forecasts.  Given asymmetries 
across the EU reported in the previous section, when a univariate loss function is 
employed, the results for the multivariate loss function would shed new light into 
whether those asymmetries persist or are lessened in the multivariate loss function 
case.15  
 
Table 7(a) reports the posterior mean of the shape parameter, alpha, of the multivariate 
loss function that includes a vector of forecast errors of all EU Commission forecasts, 
namely GDP growth, inflation, government balance, unemployment, investment and 
current account. Note that we report the shape parameter of the multivariate, non-
separable, loss function using as instruments a constant and one lag as in Komunjer 
and Owyang (2012).16  
              
 
15 It is worth noting that, in an early study, Kirchgassner and Muller (2006) propose a vector rationality 
test subject to the strong assumption that the underlying losses are additive separable and quadratic in 
individual variables. This is rather a restrictive assumption as it regards, for example, that the marginal 
loss for A’s country forecast is independent of the B’s country forecast despite both countries being 
members of the same union, such as the EU. Thus, under the assumption of separable loss, no 
interactions between different forecasts are present. Non-separable loss functions are of importance, as 
there must exist complementarities in the utility function of the EU Commission across countries. 
Komunjer and Owyang (2012) show that assuming additive separability of the underlying loss function 
will result to bias. To this end, any asymmetry found in the first step of our univariate rationality test 
could be biased if in a multivariate rationality test the asymmetry is restrained due to the non-
separability of the underlying loss function based on n-variate. Komunjer and Owyang (2012) further 
argue that the asymmetries observed within a univariate loss function would be abridged at a 
multivariate loss function. 
16 In Appendix C, we report alphas, but also ps, for different instrument sets to test for the consistency 
of our results. That is we opt for one and two lags of all variables in the multivariate, non-separable, 




TABLE 7 (a): Multivariate, non-separable, loss function across forecast 
errors in GDP growth, inflation, government balance, unemployment, investment 
and Current Account: the asymmetry parameter ‘alpha’.  
 
 Current year Year ahead 
 
^
  Med. SE 
^
  Med. SE 
BE 0.4375 0.4303 0.0871 0.4329 0.4243 0.0892 
DK 0.4577 0.4528 0.0985 0.4312 0.4321 0.0944 
DE 0.5359 0.5346 0.0796 0.6004 0.6024 0.0742 
EL 0.6565 0.6630 0.0186 0.6561 0.6643 0.0172 
ES 0.3358 0.3465 0.0096 0.3184 0.3260 0.0119 
FR 0.5923 0.5942 0.1124 0.5534 0.5412 0.1002 
IE 0.5427 0.5434 0.1086 0.3899 0.3852 0.1342 
IT 0.6161 0.6198 0.0950 0.4980 0.5037 0.0902 
LU 0.6310 0.6333 0.0953 0.4432 0.4489 0.1069 
NL 0.4653 0.4633 0.0966 0.5072 0.5098 0.0899 
PT 0.3111 0.3156 0.0103 0.3175 0.3106 0.0066 
UK 0.7568 0.7607 0.0752 0.4552 0.4603 0.0837 
EU 0.6253 0.6154 0.0907 0.4661 0.4710 0.0807 
Note: Estimations of the shape parameter, ‘alpha’, of a multivariate, non-separable, loss 
function across forecast errors in GDP growth, inflation, government balance, 
unemployment, investment and Current Account. In the table we report posterior means, 
posterior medians and posterior standard deviations. BE is Belgium, DK Denmark, DE 
Germany, EL Greece, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT Italy, LU Luxemburg, NL 
Netherlands, PT Portugal, UK United Kingdom, EU European Union. 
The instrument set includes:  Constant and one lag of all variables in the multivariate, 






Our results from Table 7(a) show that asymmetries are also observed in the 
multivariate loss function. Moreover, results show that there is asymmetry 
towards over prediction of the vector of forecast errors of the EU Commission in 
eight out of twelve Member States, and the EU overall, in the case of the year-
ahead forecasts. On the other hand, the EU Commission forecasts lean towards 
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under-prediction in the case of the current-year forecasts. For Greece, the EU 
Commission forecasts show preferences towards under-prediction, and this is 
true to a lesser extent for Germany and France. For some other Member States 
preferences lean towards over-prediction also in the current year (see Belgium, 
Denmark, Spain, Netherlands and Portugal). Only for Netherlands a symmetric 
multivariate, non-separable, loss function is reported for the year ahead, but 
becomes asymmetric in the current year. Clearly, overall the multivariate loss 
function of the EU Commission forecasts does not seem to correct for the 
asymmetry observed in the univariate loss function. So, asymmetry prevails. 
 
Table 7(b) reports the estimates of the ps of the multivariate loss function, 
providing information on whether is linear or nonlinear. Our results show that 
the underlying multivariate loss function is close to linearity for only a few 
EU Member States. Most EU Member States have a non-linear loss function, 
notably Greece, Portugal and Spain. For Ireland, also in the year ahead 
forecast, p the loss function takes values close to two and thereby the 
















TABLE 7 (b): Multivariate, non-separable loss function, across 
forecast errors in GDP growth, inflation, government balance, 
unemployment, investment and Current Account: the ‘ps’. 
 Current year Year ahead 
 p Med. SE p Med. SE 
BE 1.269 1.224 0.320 1.263 1.216 0.325 
DK 1.261 1.222 0.332 1.268 1.225 0.327 
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DE 1.082 1.064 0.222 0.935 0.913 0.214 
EL 0.017 0.023 0.011 0.012 0.020 0.011 
ES 0.012 0.023 0.003 0.014 0.022 0.005 
FR 1.158 1.139 0.265 1.203 1.162 0.307 
IE 1.312 1.265 0.365 2.105 1.851 1.767 
IT 1.079 1.032 0.309 1.235 1.206 0.302 
LU 1.137 1.112 0.261 1.493 1.428 0.451 
NL 1.247 1.208 0.329 1.207 1.168 0.301 
PT 0.010 0.015 0.004 0.018 0.011 0.001 
UK 1.097 1.052 0.308 0.885 0.869 0.194 
EU 1.119 1.075 0.273 0.976 0.965 0.205 
Note: Estimations of the ‘ps’ of a multivariate, non-separable, loss function across 
forecast errors in GDP growth, inflation, government balance, unemployment, 
investment and Current Account. In the table we report posterior means, posterior 
medians and posterior standard deviations. BE is Belgium, DK Denmark, DE 
Germany, EL Greece, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT Italy, LU Luxemburg, 
NL Netherlands, PT Portugal, UK United Kingdom, EU European Union. The 
instrument set includes: Constant and one lag of all variables in the multivariate, 
non-separable, loss function. 
 
4.4. Multivariate loss function for a vector of forecast errors across countries 
In the previous section, we reveal the underlying multivariate loss function per EU 
Member State across different macro-finance variables. In this section we shift our 
attention to a multivariate loss function per macro-finance variable across EU 
Member States. We perform this testing to justify whether the EU Commission 
preferences regarding macro-finance forecasting are shaped considering economic 
conditions across Member States, and not just on one Member States. Note that 
the EU Commission forecasts are part of DG ECFIN mandate, and in particular 
they fall within the fiat of national desks of DG ECFIN of the EU Commission. 
As such, they are form in vacuum.  EU DG ECFIN national desks employ several 
national experts to form Commission forecasts for every EU Member State.  Some 
of those experts are EU nationals of the EU Member State in question. In this the 
case a consistency cross check exercise across national desks within the DG 
ECFIN would take place in every forecasting round (see Keereman, 2003) and 
before publishing such forecasts. As such, consultation might affect the shape of 
the loss function of forecasts, and therefore, an appropriate way to deal with it is 
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to test for asymmetries for a multivariate loss function across EU Member States. 
Thus, we estimate a multivariate, non-separable, loss function per EU forecast 
across Member States.  
 
Table 8(a) reports alphas of this multivariate loss likelihood per variable across 
all the EU-12 Member States. As previously, we employ a constant and one 
forecast error as instruments.17  Once more, our results show that asymmetries in 
the multivariate loss function exist. Interestingly, preferences lean towards over-
prediction, and thus optimism, for all variables but inflation, in the year ahead 
forecast. For government balance this over-prediction persists also in the current 
year forecast. But, for GDP growth, current account and unemployment in the 
EU Commission preferences shift towards under-prediction and thus pessimism 
for the current year. For government balance, we get deviation from symmetry 
towards under-prediction, for both the current year and the year ahead. Therfore, 
there is a certain degree of optimism for government balance, a key variable in 
the annual macroeconomic monitoring of the state of national EU economies, in 
particular for the euro-area countries. For investment, and to a less extend for 












TABLE 8 (a): Multivariate loss function, non-separable loss function, in forecast 
errors across EU Member States:  the asymmetry parameter ‘alpha’. 
             Current year         Year ahead 
 
^
  Med. SE 
^
  Med. SE 
INF 0.524 0.533 0.108 0.558 0.553 0.087 
INV 0.506 0.502 0.078 0.484 0.470 0.079 
GBAL 0.336 0.329 0.072 0.451 0.449 0.103 
UN 0.657 0.656 0.085 0.377 0.386 0.084 
 
17 Appendix C reports the shape parameters and ps for instruments of one and two lags of all variables 
in the multivariate, non-separable, loss function.  
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CA 0.716 0.725 0.145 0.376 0.367 0.103 
GDP 0.621 0.618 0.084 0.467 0.471 0.088 
Note: In the table we report posterior means, posterior medians and posterior standard deviations. 
Estimations of the ‘alpha’ of a multivariate, non-separable, loss function that is a function of 
forecast errors in the selected variables (i.e. INF inflation) across all Member States in our sample 
(namely Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom). INF notes inflation, INV is investment, GBAL is the 
government balance, UN is unemployment, CA is current account and GDP is GDP growth. The 




Table 8(b) shows that the loss function is not linear but close to linear, with the 
exception of CA, where a quadratic loss function is reported for current year, and to a 
lesser extent in the year ahead. 
 
TABLE 8 (b): Multivariate loss function, non-separable loss function, in 
forecast errors across EU Member States: ‘ps’ across all EU Member States. 
 Current year Year ahead 
 p Med. SE p Med. SE 
INF 0.692 0.675 0.229 0.901 0.858 0.225 
INV 0.725 0.709 0.161 0.730 0.720 0.158 
GBAL 0.969 0.952 0.216 1.317 1.279 0.311 
UN 1.050 1.034 0.238 0.618 0.602 0.176 
CA 2.004 2.285 1.933 1.647 1.549 0.583 
GDP 1.111 1.087 0.290 0.985 0.955 0.212 
Note: In the table we report posterior means, posterior medians and posterior standard 
deviations. Estimations of the ‘ps’ of a multivariate, non-separable, loss function across 
Member States of EU (namely Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, 
Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, United Kingdom). INF notes inflation, INV is 
investment, GBAL is the government balance, UN is unemployment, CA is Current Account, 
and GDP is GDP growth. The instrument set includes: Constant and one lag of all variables 
in the multivariate, non-separable loss, function. 
 
4.5. Multivariate loss function with covariates  
In the previous section, we showed that national desks in the DG ECFIN proceed with 
a consultation over their forecasts, which ultimately shape their loss functions. In this 
section, given the flexibility of our loss function, which allows covariates in a single 
stage estimation, we run regressions to examine which of the national forecasts affect 
the most the EU Commission forecasts and thereby its underlying loss function.  
 
4.5.1. The EU multivariate loss function regression  
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Table 9 reports the regressions from the likelihood function in Equation (11) of the 
EU forecasts for each variable in our sample.18 Note that we report results for an 
instrument set that includes a constant and one lag in variables.19 
 
A strong result emerges from Table 9. National forecasts of large economies in the EU 
such as Germany and France appear to predominantly shape the loss function of the 
EU Commission forecasts across all macro-finance variables. Some other national 
forecasts, such as the UK, Italy, Netherlands, Germany and Belgium, also assert a 
statistical and economic significant effect on, for example, the EU Commission GDP 
growth forecast.  Perhaps not surprisingly, when it comes to EU Commission 
government-balance forecasts, the Greek national forecasts assert a statistically 
significant effect, however, it is not of the same magnitude as the one of large 
 
18 Along with the regression results we estimate ‘alphas’ of a multivariate, non-separable, loss of the 
EU forecast errors as function of forecast errors of all Member States in our sample (namely Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, United 
Kingdom). Our results confirmed the findings of Table 8(a), since asymmetry is observed in all 
variables, but investment.  
19 Appendix C, see Table C9, reports the shape parameters and ps for instruments of one and two lags.  
 
TABLE 9: Multivariate loss function regressions of the EU Commission forecasts across 
EU Member States. 
Dependent INF  GBAL  CA INV UN GDP 
 Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
C -0.030 -0.573 0.098 1.280 -0.026 -0.689 -0.109 -0.631 -0.018 -0.792 0.028 0.761 
lag 0.040 0.452 0.006 0.076 0.009 -0.056 0.056 1.239 -0.009 -0.627 0.012 0.034 
BE 0.009 0.141 0.047 1.469 0.086 2.999 0.031 0.713 0.049 1.189 0.083 2.269 
DK 0.022 0.292 0.015 0.072 0.025 0.819 -0.005 -0.746 0.039 1.171 -0.024 -1.198 
DE 0.238 2.290 0.287 5.938 0.321 10.499 0.292 7.584 0.256 9.273 0.229 4.840 
EL 0.034 0.726 0.045 2.116 -0.023 -1.633 0.022 0.906 0.053 2.951 -0.005 -0.489 
ES 0.083 0.583 0.016 0.337 0.027 0.611 0.091 1.958 0.090 3.801 0.024 0.677 
FR 0.387 3.325 0.173 3.315 0.110 2.620 0.364 4.613 0.269 7.222 0.224 4.638 
IE 0.007 0.084 0.002 -0.083 0.037 1.565 0.038 1.779 0.035 2.098 0.035 1.973 
IT 0.155 2.730 -0.014 -3.825 0.269 9.960 0.124 2.489 0.121 4.288 0.193 8.115 
LU -0.081 -0.826 0.022 0.577 0.002 -0.665 0.001 -0.890 -0.017 -0.346 0.016 0.871 
NL 0.186 2.030 0.101 2.469 0.052 2.253 0.010 -0.091 0.099 3.694 0.098 2.216 
PT -0.004 -0.252 0.052 1.381 0.115 4.447 0.024 0.497 0.066 1.973 -0.008 -0.484 
UK 0.111 2.177 0.213 6.205 0.153 6.791 0.158 4.083 0.135 3.123 0.194 7.411 
alpha 0.367 0.110 0.660 0.296 0.614 0.264 0.462 0.293 0.436 3.934 0.563 0.260 
ps 0.924 0.268 1.475 1.313 1.325 0.096 1.621 1.436 1.337 0.873 1.619 1.227 
Note: Forecast errors are for the year ahead. Similar regressions are available under request for current year 
forecasts. BE is Belgium, DK Denmark, DE Germany, EL Greece, ES Spain, FR France, IE Ireland, IT 
Italy, LU Luxemburg, NL Netherlands, PT Portugal, UK United Kingdom, EU European Union. Dependent 
variable is EU forecast error. INF notes inflation, INV is investment, GBAL is the government balance, 
UN is unemployment, CA is Current Account, and GDP is GDP growth. C refers to constant, Lag counts 
for the lagged dependent variable that is included to observe any persistence. The instrument set includes:  
Constant and one lag of all variables in the multivariate, non-separable, loss function. 
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economies such as Germany, France and the UK. It is of interest that Italy’s national 
forecasts on the EU Commission inflation forecast carries a negative sign. This last 
finding is in line with Keereman (1999). In terms of the shape of the multivariate loss 
function, alphas (see Table 9) show that asymmetry prevails, in line with previous 
sections. Again, for most of the variables the EU Commission forecasts lean towards 
over-prediction and thus optimism. Table 9 also reports the results for ρs, which 
indicate a non-linear multivariate loss function.  
 
Overall, the above evidence reinforces the view that EU forecasts are not formed in a 
vacuum and a univariate loss function would fail to pick the ‘true’ directional 
preferences. In fact, we provide evidence that the shape of the multivariate loss 
function of the EU Commission forecasts is strongly correlated with national forecasts 
of large EU economies. The sign of such correlation is mostly positive, though some 
negative correlations are also observed. 
 
4.5.2. National multivariate loss function regressions 
Given that we find evidence of the importance of some large Member States of the EU 
in shaping the loss function of the DG ECFIN forecasts, we further explore whether 
such asymmetries prevail at national level. Table 10 reports multivariate loss function 
regressions for the large Member States of the EU. In order to facilitate the 
presentation, we focus on the main DG ECFIN forecast variable, the GDP growth. We 
investigate the covariance between the GDP forecast error and the rest of macro-




TABLE 10: Multivariate loss function regressions of GDP forecast errors for 
selected EU Member States. 
 EU DE FR IT NL UK 
 Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat 




-1.31 -0.29 -2.42 -0.11 -0.63 -0.18 -1.02 -0.44 -3.72 -0.10 -1.09 
INF 0.01 0.13 0.52 1.97 -0.06 -0.42 0.14 0.61 0.27 1.01 -0.39 -3.76 
GBAL 0.93 7.27 0.63 3.61 0.64 3.41 -0.03 -1.38 0.58 5.78 0.28 2.81 
CA 0.18 0.81 0.19 1.13 0.13 0.60 -0.17 -0.75 0.22 2.41 -0.28 -2.97 
 
20 Appendix C reports the shape parameters and ps for instruments of one and two lags.  
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UN 0.11 1.03 -0.30 -1.51 0.00 -0.02 -0.17 -1.42 -0.23 -1.82 -0.08 -0.38 
alpha 0.30 7.05 0.46 2.81 0.46 1.75 0.35 3.89 0.56 3.94 0.34 2.13 
ps 1.19 2.95 1.90 2.03 2.89 2.03 1.01 4.34 2.27 1.21 1.56 1.93 
 
Note: Forecast errors are for year ahead. Similar regressions are available under request for 
current year forecasts. DE Germany, FR France, IT Italy, NL Netherlands, UK United 
Kingdom, EU European Union. Dependent variable is forecast error in GDP growth. INF 
notes inflation, INV is investment, GBAL is the government balance, UN is unemployment, 
CA is current account, and GDP is GDP growth. C refers to constant, Lag counts for the lagged 
dependent variable that is included to observe any persistence. The instruments used are: 
Constant and one lag of all variables in the multivariate, non-separable, loss function. 
 
Interestingly, forecast errors in government balances assert a positive and statistically 
significant impact on growth forecast errors in all countries, but Italy (though it is 
insignificant). This result implies that fiscal imbalances would increase forecast errors 
in GDP growth that in turn allows certain leeway in the required fiscal consolidation. 
On the other hand, there is a negative correlation between inflation and GDP growth 
forecast error in the UK, insinuating some type of underlying supply shocks. Lagged 
GDP forecast errors have a negative and significant effect on present forecast errors 
in Germany and Netherlands.  
 
The results for alphas show, once more, asymmetry in the underlying multivariate loss 
function towards preferences that leans to over-prediction and thus optimism for all 
large EU Member States, but Netherlands, whilst ps indicate nonlinearities. 
 
4.6 Monte Carlo Validation of the multivariate loss 
As part of validating the accuracy and consistency of our estimation method we 
proceed with the Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). Here we follow exactly the 
data generating process as in Table 2 of Komunjer and Owyang (2012).21 Table 11 
reports results from the MCMC. We use 60,000 MCMC iterations. For brevity, we 
report only the relative mean square error (MSE thereafter) from the separable 
(multivariate loss function) to the non-separable (univariate loss) case. Table 11 
provides evidence showing that our proposed Bayesian estimation performance is 
comparable to Komunjer and Owyang (2012). All standard deviations of our 
estimation are always lower than those of Komunjer and Owyang (2012).  
 
21 Moreover, Komunjer and Owyang (2012) presented results from 1000 Monte Carlo replications for 
five different instruments. They show that mis-specification exists when the loss is assumed as 
univariate compared to the true multivariate loss function. 
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Table 11. Comparison of relative MSE with Komunjer and Owyang (2012).  
 Komunjer and Owyang (2012) 
Multivariate Loss
 
Present Multivariate Loss 
Instrument set 
1











1 15.09 109.79 132.98 4.12 11.12 13.05 
2 17.14 108.61 134.23 4.33 12.05 14.54 
3 18.49 106.49 128.50 4.71 14.17 17.21 
4 20.06 105.25 122.48 6.87 17.36 21.12 
5 16.88 106.24 131.97 5.12 15.55 15.59 
Posterior 
analysis 
- - - 4.12 11.22 13.05 
Notes: The row headed ‘posterior analysis’ gives results for posterior means derived using MCMC. 
The other elements are derived from BETEL using the instrument sets described in the first column 
and they are exactly the same as in Komunjer and Owyang (2012), Table 2. 
 
Moreover, the reported MSE simulations prove that falsely adopting a univariate loss 
function could disguise the fact that forecast errors are not independent and as such 
the true underlying loss function could be mis-specified, along with its shape. Our new 
multivariate loss function offers an efficient way to correct for this mis-specification.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we propose a multivariate, non-separable, loss likelihood function, where 
a vector of forecast errors is present.  Control variables are also present in the loss 
function. We show that the Bayesian generalization of an empirical likelihood known 
as Bayesian exponentially tilted empirical likelihood (BETEL) is more efficient than 
the standard likelihood function in the literature. In an empirical application, we focus 
on testing for asymmetries in the EU Commission forecasts, given their importance 
due to strong conditionality imposed to some euro-area Member States that have been 
under financial distress. The reported evidence shows that the EU Commission 
forecasts are predominantly asymmetric, leaning towards optimism in the year-ahead 
forecasts, and towards pessimism in the current year, in particular for the GDP growth 
and the government balance. We also find that size matters as large Member States of 
the EU have a dominant role in shaping the multivariate loss function of the EU 
Commission forecasts and in turn the EU Commission’s preferences lean towards 
optimism regarding large EU Member States forecasts. The EU forecasts should be 
interpreted with caution as they predominantly project a promising picture with 
regards to the EU economy, yet the EU growth remains anaemic since the financial 
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crisis. It would benefit the implementation of an economic policy to shed new lights 
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